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Abstract
Stabilisation Agriculture has been defined as a focus on enhancing the ecological and social resilience 
of agricultural communities to withstand and respond to adverse conditions in countries affected by 
disasters, ranging from climate events to conflict and complex emergencies. However, in this review 
paper, rather than taking a broad disaster risk management approach to the topic, a focus is made on 
the nexus between agriculture, food security and conflict. Food insecurity, for example, can trigger 
instability and conflict, leading to the collapse of agricultural infrastructure, the loss of farm labour, 
and local farming knowledge through loss of life and forced migration. This cycle becomes endemic 
and reinforcing, often resulting in chronic food shortages and eventually conflict-driven famine. Hence, 
why an emphasis on post-conflict “stabilisation” is made in this examination of the emerging concept 
of Stabilisation Agriculture. Case studies from Afghanistan and Iraq are used to illustrate the benefits 
of elevating agriculture as a critical response tool in post-conflict and stabilisation settings, and 
following a subsequent discussion that explores the critical synergies in this emerging field, a redefined 
definition of Stabilisation Agriculture is proposed along with recommendations for future development 
through policy inclusion and mainstreaming, post-conflict programming and applied research.
Keywords: food security, post-conflict, resilience, stabilisation agriculture, stabilisation
Review methodology: The review on stabilisation theory was based on a desk-based study of policy material from several donor 
government agencies, including Denmark, the UK, and the USA. The review of the current definitions of Stabilisation Agriculture was 
conducted through an examination of books and professional magazines addressing the interface of agriculture and conflict and an 
examination of recent Stabilisation Agriculture promotional materials from Coventry University. For the Afghanistan case study, the review 
of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and the British Army’s CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) unit’s activities is drawn from the 
third author’s participation in these activities, in Afghanistan and in the UK delivering training and support to deployed personnel (2008–
2012). This work culminated in a multinational “lessons-learnt” exercise in 2014. All Afghanistan material is open source and reflects the 
authors’ viewpoints and not that of the organisations involved. For the Iraq case study, the final technical reports of three UNDP-funded 
Stabilisation Agriculture project reports were reviewed. All the Iraq material is open source (available online at Human Relief Foundation) 
and again reflects the authors’ viewpoints and not that of the organisations involved. In terms of community engagement and the data 
collection tools used in Afghanistan and Iraq, these are briefly discussed in each case study, but in both cases they clearly form compo-
nents of the respective implementing agencies’ rapid need assessment tool kits, as opposed to in-depth participatory research tools.
Introduction
Stabilisation Agriculture has been defined as a focus on 
enhancing the ecological and social resilience of agricultural 
communities to withstand and respond to adverse 
conditions in countries affected by disasters, ranging from 
climate events to conflict and complex emergencies [1]. 
The term “agricultural communities” is used to refer to 
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people engaged in the production, processing and 
distribution of food, medicine, fuel and fibre through the 
cultivation of plants and livestock husbandry in both urban 
and rural settings. In a pre-disaster phase, for example, 
sustainable agricultural interventions, such as agroecology 
and/or agroforestry, can be used as a land management 
tool in disaster risk reduction (DRR) programmes, whilst 
in the post-disaster phase, the principle aim of Stabilisation 
Agriculture is the swift re-establishment of primary food 
production systems that are more resilient than previous 
systems [2]. In this context, resilience goes beyond the 
“field” and applies equally across social perspectives, 
permeating into areas such as social cohesion and 
peacebuilding, particularly in fragile geographical areas 
beset by violence and conflict. As Rohwerder [3] highlights 
there is a “need for more research into the impact of 
conflict, protracted crises and disasters caused by natural 
hazards on agriculture and especially into the effectiveness 
of different efforts to support and rebuild agriculture”. 
These issues are some of the themes that will be explored 
in this review paper that aims to examine the emerging 
concept of Stabilisation Agriculture. The paper includes a 
brief introduction to stabilisation theory along with an 
explanation of the current definitions of Stabilisation 
Agriculture. This will be followed by the presentation of 
two case studies, the first is from a UK Government-
funded stabilisation programme in Afghanistan, and the 
second is from three UNDP-funded Stabilisation 
Agriculture projects in Iraq. Following a subsequent 
discussion that explores the critical synergies in this 
emerging field, a redefined definition of Stabilisation 
Agriculture is proposed along with recommendations for 
future development through policy inclusion and 
mainstreaming, post-conflict programming and applied 
research.
Stabilisation: from a theory to action
Over the last decade, the concept and approach of using 
“stabilisation” as a mechanism to respond to violent 
conflicts in an attempt to re-establish security and prepare 
for longer-term recovery have been substantially 
developed. Stabilisation has been fully incorporated by 
several donor government agencies, which include the 
UK’s cross-government Stabilisation Unit; USAID’s Bureau 
for Conflict Prevention and Stabilisation (CPS) and 
Denmark’s Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) headed by 
its own Inter-Governmental Steering Committee (IGSC). 
Likewise, stabilisation programming has also been fully 
integrated by UN agencies, particularly by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which 
currently has stabilisation programmes in Iraq, Libya, 
Nigeria and Yemen [4].
In essence, these stabilisation approaches are quite 
similar. For example, in the UK context, stabilisation is 
defined as “an activity undertaken as an initial response to 
violence or the immediate threat of violence” ([5], p. 13). 
In the US context, the aim of the CPS is to “strengthen 
USAID’s capacity to prevent conflict, address fragility, 
respond to global crises in a more strategic, integrated 
way, and act as a stabilizing force in times of transition” 
([6], p. 1). Denmark also deploys a flexible instrument, 
through the use of its PSF, which is an inter-ministerial fund 
with the objective to support efforts at the interface 
between security and development [7]. Likewise, the UK 
government’s objective through stabilisation interventions 
is to “support local and regional partners in conflict-
affected countries to reduce violence, ensure basic security 
and facilitate peaceful political deal-making, all of which 
should aim to provide a foundation for building long-term 
stability” ([5], p. 11). To enact this, it employs three central 
stabilisation principles:
1. protecting the means of survival;
2. promoting and supporting a political process to  reduce 
violence and
3. preparing a foundation for longer-term stability.
The first principle addresses any immediate security 
concerns, thus building opportunities that allow peaceful 
political processes that in time support the restoration 
of long-term stability. The second principle ensures 
stabilisation supports and fosters political deals and 
bargains amongst key conflict elites and actors. Ensuring 
that any pre-conflict situations that were inequitable 
and/or unsustainable are not repeated, but rather deeper 
and more resilient solutions are found that prepare a 
foundation for longer-term stability, the final stabilisation 
principle, which may range from months to years to 
achieve. It is also anticipated that shorter-term 
stabilisation interventions will be delivered simultaneously 
and will overlap with other approaches, such as DFID’s 
Building Stability Framework or similar approaches from 
supporting partners and/or local governments. Finally, 
the UK government highlights the importance of 
incorporating a conflict-sensitive approach to ensure 
that a peace-building process is adopted, as well as a 
gender-sensitive approach, so that the linkages between 
gender and conflict are addressed, thus reducing the 
gender-based causes, and negative gender impacts, of 
conflict [5].
Defining stabilisation agriculture
“Stabilisation Agriculture” as an academic term was first 
coined by Prof. Phillip Harris from the Centre of 
Agroecology and Food Security (CAFS),1 Coventry 
University in 2010 [2]. Interestingly back in 1961, and 
1In 2014, the Centre of Agroecology and Food Security (CAFS) 
merged with other research entities at Coventry University to 
become the Centre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience 
(CAWR).
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unbeknown to Prof. Harris, an Agricultural Stabilisation 
and Conservation Service (ASCS) was established in the 
USA and functioned up to 1994, with its remit including 
the stabilisation of farm income and conservation of the 
natural resource base that agriculture depends on, as 
reflected in the former US government agency’s descriptive 
title. In many ways, these early resilience-based objectives 
were encapsulated in CAFS’s [1] first definition of 
Stabilisation Agriculture, which:
focuses on enhancing the ecological and social resilience of 
agriculture to withstand and respond to adverse conditions 
in countries affected by natural and human-induced 
disasters, both pre- and post-disaster. The main components 
include:
• Re-establishing agriculture after human-induced or natural 
disasters
• Exploring sustainable agriculture and institutional 
engagement in “stabilisation” regions
• Sustainable management of abiotic stresses in agriculture, 
such as drought, salinity, contaminated land and climate 
change
• Sustainable management of biotic stresses in agriculture, 
such as invasive plant species, insect plagues.
With regard to re-establishing agriculture, emphasis is placed 
on the transition to a more “regenerative agriculture” 
approach, rather than a simple continuation of—or return 
to—the previous system, for example, implementing 
agroecology or an agroforestry-based system. Another key 
component is its operationalisation in identified “stabilisation 
regions”, such as, at the time of writing, Libya, Somalia and 
Zimbabwe, or the two subsequent case studies: Afghanistan 
and Iraq.
These concepts were developed 1 year later in 2011, 
when the Stabilisation Agriculture concept was formerly 
launched at an international workshop in London, jointly 
organised by the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation 
Studies2 (CPRS) and the Centre for Agroecology and 
Food Security (CAFS), both at Coventry University. The 
ambitious aim of the workshop was to “define a shared 
understanding of agriculture in the context of stabilisation 
after natural and man-made disasters, to identify best 
practice and constraints, and to develop an agenda for 
research and policy development with the aim of 
improving interventions” ([8], p. 1). Interestingly, one of 
the key findings of the workshop was “that despite the 
importance of sustainable agriculture in such challenging 
environments, little has been published to date on the 
subject” ([8], p. 1).
Following the workshop, an attempt to reverse this 
trend was attempted with the publication of an edited 
volume from Ӧzerdem and Roberts [8] entitled  “Challenging 
Post-conflict Environments: Sustainable Agriculture”. This 
2The Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies (CPRS) is 
now known as Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations 
(CTPSR).
comprehensive collection of papers included conflict-
related case studies from Afghanistan [9], Cambodia [10], 
Indonesia [11], Lebanon [12], Nepal [13], Sri Lanka [14], 
Sierra Leone [15–17] and Sudan [18]. More conventional 
agricultural research related to agriculture, development 
and sustainability was also included in the volume [8]. 
Separate from this, and 2 years later, another edited volume 
was published, this time by Tidball and Krasny [19] entitled 
“Greening in the Red Zone: Disaster, Resilience and 
Community Greening”. Although there was no reference 
made to Ӧzerdem and Roberts [8], the work of Tidball and 
Krasny [19] encapsulated some of previous principles of 
Stabilisation Agriculture but through a different lens and 
with distinct and unique terminology. For example, they 
started with their own concept of “greening”, which was 
defined as:
an active and integrated approach to the appreciation, 
stewardship and management of living elements of 
social-ecological systems. Greening takes place in cities, 
towns, townships and informal settlements in urban and 
peri-urban areas, and in the battle fields of war and disaster 
([20], p. 7).
In this definition, the battle fields were the red zone, 
defined as:
multiple settings (spatial and temporal) that may be 
characterized as intense, potentially or recently hostile or 
dangerous, including those in post-disaster situations 
caused by natural disasters such as hurricanes and 
earthquakes, as well as those associated with terrorist 
attacks and war ([20], p. 8).
From a Stabilisation Agriculture perspective, this volume 
included some relevant case studies from Afghanistan [21, 
22], Bosnia-Herzegovina [23], Cameroon [24], Japan [25] 
and Liberia [26], although throughout the volume there 
was no mention of “stabilisation” from either a post-conflict 
or a post-disaster context. It was not until 2016 that the 
term gained increased traction following the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) funding of a 
pilot Stabilisation Agriculture project in Iraq (see Section 
“Stabilisation Agriculture Programmes in Salah Al-Din 
Governorate, Iraq”). In the same year, the definition was 
developed by CAWR [27] and appeared in a promotional 
pamphlet and was also published in a book chapter ([2], 
p. 73). These modifications consisted of the four main 
components of Stabilisation Agriculture being slightly 
modified and extended, thus becoming six components, 
and including for the first time aspects of forced 
displacement, such as working with urban agriculture in 
displacement camps3 and in cities where numerous dispersed 
refugees or distinct pockets of refugee populations can be 
found:
3Includes refugee camps as well as camps for internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), otherwise known as IDP camps.
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1. integrating and mainstreaming agroecology through 
programmes, policies and institutions, for disaster risk re-
duction (DRR);
2. agroecology for refugee camps and settlements;
3. urban agriculture for dispersed refugees and host com-
munities in urban areas;
4. facilitating transitions: (i) food aid to food production; 
(ii) refugees to returnees and (iii) combatants to farmers;
5. sustainable management of abiotic stresses in agriculture, 
such as drought, salinity, contaminated land and  climate 
change and
6. sustainable management of biotic stresses in agriculture, 
such as invasive plant species and insect plagues.
This inclusion of urban agriculture and displacement 
camps stemmed from humanitarian operations and 
applied research work that featured in a special edition 
of Urban Agriculture Magazine [28], which included a 
range of emergency refugee camp and urban food 
security-related case studies with examples from Ethiopia 
[29], Indonesia [30], Iraq [31], Jordan [32], Kenya [33, 34], 
Liberia [35], Sierra Leone [36], Uganda [37, 38] and 
Zimbabwe [39].
More recently in Iraq and Jordan, the role of urban 
agriculture in displacement camps has been further 
investigated [40], with research findings highlighting the 
multiple benefits, for example, the importance of space for 
both personal peace and wellbeing, fresh food, trees and 
greenery, livelihood and daily practical activities and a 
contribution to building a sense of belonging, community and 
home [41]. Likewise the actual challenges of incorporating urban 
agriculture into camp infrastructure have also been identified 
[42]. Other strands of this work have looked at some of the 
innovative aspects to urban agriculture including agroforestry 
[43], the role of wild edible plants [44] and sustainable drainage 
systems (SuDS) [45], and even the linkages to urban planning 
in times of crisis have been made [46].
In the most recent promotional materials from CAWR 
[47, 48], the main components of Stabilisation Agriculture 
have again been modified and currently reach a total of 
eight, whilst the introductory overview of the concept 
now includes references to the use of “agroecology-based 
practical processes” and “transdisciplinary knowledge 
systems” [47, 48]. At the same time, research emanating 
from this group is exploring the transformative potential 
of agroecology for peace building in fragile states [49]. As 
more rigorous case studies are developed and the peer-
reviewed evidence base is expanded, further modifications 
of the stabilisation definition will be made that strengthen 
the linkages between operational conditions on the ground 
and stabilisation theory.
Practices of stabilisation agriculture
Through examining the practices and circumstances of 
Stabilisation Agriculture, the concept and its understanding 
will continue to be developed. Case studies are thus 
relevant and useful to highlight the critical role that 
agriculture can play in post-conflict and stabilisation 
settings. In this section, the first case study provides an 
overview of the development of Stabilisation Agriculture in 
Helmand Province, Afghanistan, through a Civil Military 
Co-Operation (CIMIC) approach with the UK forces in 
Afghanistan and the Afghanistan Ministry of Agriculture of 
Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL). Then, the second case 
study examines three UNDP-funded Stabilisation 
Agriculture programmes implemented by the Human 
Relief Foundation (HRF) in Salah Al-Din Governorate, Iraq. 
Although both approaches substantially differ, each offers 
important lessons for the furtherance of this specific 
discipline.
Development of stabilisation agriculture in Helmand 
Province,  Afghanistan
In 2008, the UK forces in Afghanistan began including 
agriculture within their Civil Military Co-Operation 
(CIMIC) activities, with the recognition that understanding, 
and including, agriculture was essential within their 
“Comprehensive Approach” and the emerging “Helmand 
Road Map” (a 2-year stabilisation plan). The inclusion of 
agriculture was at first seen as part of the promotion of 
“alternative or licit livelihoods” to counter widespread 
opium poppy growing, as it had become increasingly clear 
that there was a gap between the needs of counter 
narcotics operations and those of the civil-military 
community. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
based in Helmand Province was poorly resourced to 
consider agriculture, and its positioning under Counter 
Narcotics (CN) did little for the promotion of coherent 
livelihood strategies. Counter Narcotics was focused on 
eliminating opium poppy growing and then delivering licit 
agricultural livelihoods, but this approach did not 
necessarily create the conditions for a thriving agricultural 
economy to develop as an antithesis to the narcotic 
economy.
Indeed, the lack of coherence regarding how agriculture 
was to be promoted as a livelihood led to some initial 
setbacks. Efforts to promote agricultural development 
under the Counter Narcotics programme included a 
wheat seed and fertiliser distribution project that was 
launched in the autumn of 2008 and which had lasting 
negative impacts. The plan had been to promote wheat as 
an alternative crop by offering free seed and fertiliser to 
registered farmers in the Helmand Green Zone, the 
irrigated area bordering the river Helmand.  This promotion 
was undertaken with little understanding of local cultural 
systems and caused profound disquiet amongst existing 
traders and suppliers as well as farmers who found 
themselves outside the scheme’s boundaries. The message 
that farmers received was that some of them were more 
worthy of support from the Government and the PRT 
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than others. It was furthermore unclear how much of the 
free fertiliser actually ended up on opium poppy production. 
As a PRT-driven exercise, it also lacked what the PRT 
termed (somewhat colonially) “the Afghan face”, which 
was considered important in promoting the emerging 
Ministry of Agriculture of Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL). 
In late 2008, the PRT focus then shifted to developing 
markets though the construction of a new facility at 
Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital. The Lashkar Gah Bost 
Airport and Agriculture Centre would provide an outlet 
for new ventures to purchase and process goods from the 
surrounding towns and villages, ultimately for export. As a 
capital-intensive project lacking wider infrastructure and at 
some distance from the growing areas, this project was 
doomed to fail. Farmers chose not to travel into such an 
insecure area, preferring to sell their production locally or 
to buyers who came to them, thus alleviating them of 
transport problems. This latter concern was the real 
determinant for the farmer, as the risk encountered in 
accessing the market and returning through multiple check 
points where bribes were common place was a real 
disincentive to seek new markets. The risks from travelling 
to Lashkar Gah also included robbery and improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) that had been set for security 
forces. Hence, the advantages of trading with merchants in 
cash now, even if the prices were lower, rather than 
travelling to Lashkar Gah with the prospect of greater 
return but at the risk of losing it to informal checkpoints 
or robbery.
Whilst the PRT focused on large “quick win” projects, 
the military returned to more nuanced activities, seeking 
to understand and influence farmers at ground level and to 
identify where Afghan Ministry of Agriculture staff could 
make real impact. The freedom of movement offered by 
the military made coverage of the Province from Garmsir 
in the south to Musa Qala in the north a reality. Most 
importantly, the military’s work was tasked at the district 
level through an appointed “civilian stabilisation officer”4 
who liaised with the local Governor in community 
engagement meetings (shuras) at the district levels. 
Through local meetings with farmers, market traders and 
others, participants’ priorities were set. Work was divided 
into two core components: production and market. In the 
case of the market, the emphasis was placed on delivery of 
safe, secure spaces for markets to function. This included 
not only security guards but also the provision of solar 
lighting, waste removal processes and the slowing down of 
traffic. On the production side, the tasks revolved around 
a situation analysis ahead of the arrival of Afghan MAIL staff 
and identifying potential projects. Long-term projects 
included the rehabilitation of salinized soils and irrigation 
canals and the promotion of value adding through the 
4Each battlegroup had a civilian stabilisation officer, appointed by 
the Foreign Office—Stabilisation Unit who held the rank equiva-
lent to that of military battlegroup commander.
construction of grape drying houses. The actions were 
small, financially judicious and focused on farmer contact.
Measuring success was difficult in such circumstances, 
but observation of market activity indicated that small 
interventions were having a positive impact, for example, 
the re-use of cardboard boxes (previously burnt) for the 
transport of tomatoes, which had a small but significant 
impact on farmer incomes in that there was substantially 
less fresh produce wastage on the journey to market than 
transporting them in a sack as was done previously. By 
March 2009, awareness of the ability of agriculture to unite 
populations, influence political opinion and deliver 
economic benefit was clear.  As commanders saw the value 
of recognising agriculture not as a method of countering 
narcotics but as the most appropriate means of reaching 
the population, kinetic activities were planned specifically 
to reduce impact on key agricultural infrastructure, and a 
wider reach for agricultural extension was sought. This 
came in the form of repurposing a radio broadcasting 
system—Radio In A Box (RIAB). Originally designed so the 
government could broadcast to the civilian population 
advice on military operations, Musa Qala District led the 
way by turning it over to a young Afghan DJ who broadcast 
music and interviews from around the town. Included in 
the content was a daily “agricultural feature” scripted by a 
member of the stabilisation team and translated into 
Pashto. Topics included fertiliser application, pesticide use 
and market updates. So whilst not promoting sustainable 
agriculture, these were widely listened to in the area, and 
within a few weeks, requests for features were being made.
The outcome of these actions was to positively reinforce 
the role and image of the local government and the MAIL 
staff and to deliver quickly across a range of geographies. 
This work built up over the next few years as more 
agriculturally trained staff were deployed who could 
identify, engage with contractors and monitor projects. 
Whilst the employment of (a less sustainable form of) 
Stabilisation Agriculture could never be claimed to have 
achieved peace, in pockets around Helmand, it helped 
establish the legitimacy of the government amongst key 
community members and opened a pathway for the Afghan 
MAIL staff to engage in wider agricultural development.
Stabilisation agriculture programmes in Salah Al-Din 
Governorate, Iraq
From 2015 to 2017, the Human Relief Foundation (HRF), a 
British-based non-governmental organisation, implemented 
a series of short duration but high-impacting stabilisation 
interventions in Salah Al-Din Governorate region of Iraq, 
specifically in the conflict areas that had been recently 
retaken from the Islamic State (IS). As soon as the Iraq 
Government forces, with the US air support, had pushed IS 
out of previously held cities and towns, then at the 
earliest possible opportunity, stabilisation activities were 
implemented using a cash-for-work and cash-grant modality 
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with funding from the UN Development Programme 
(UNDP). The primary objective of the programme was to 
contribute to immediate economic stabilisation through 
the provision of “cash injections” that were designed to 
stimulate livelihoods and start an initial process of 
economic activity.
In 2015, the first stabilisation interventions were 
implemented in the city of Tikrit and thus consisted of 
urban-based activities. For example, the cash-for-work 
activities included painting over IS graffiti, rubble removal 
and street cleaning, and the small cash grants were issued 
to small businesses, such as bakeries, grocers and repair 
shops, so they could restock and start trading. Small cash 
grants were also made available for housing repairs, which 
also stimulated the market and supply chain for building 
materials [50]. Even the fighting-damaged campus of Tikrit 
University was cleaned-up with the use of HRF cash-for-
work teams, which then led to the reopening of the 
University in December 2015 and the subsequent return 
of over 5000 students, thus accelerating the early recovery 
in the city of Tikrit [51].
Following this early success in Tikrit, and as more 
territory was retaken from IS in Salah Al-Din Governorate, 
the emphasis of the programme changed from urban-
based activities to a programme designed around local 
agriculture, particularly as the geographical areas being 
retaken were becoming mainly rural settlements with 
predominantly agriculture-based livelihoods. This led, in 
2016 and after a transitional period during the first 
phase, to a distinct shift to Stabilisation Agriculture 
interventions, with three programme interventions 
running in succession in the retaken district areas of Al 
Hajaj [52], Dhuluiyah [53] and Yathrib [54]. The first 
intervention with a duration of 3 months was in the 
district town Al Hajaj on the River Tigris, located south 
of the city Baiji. Following a need assessment, conducted 
through a “community platform” consisting of community 
leaders and members ([52], p. 2), the following conflict-
related linkages were made:
While the damage and destruction of buildings such as 
residential housing is less severe than in some other areas 
there has nevertheless been substantial impacts to local 
infrastructure and the natural resource base that underpins 
the livelihoods for many of the farmers that are resident in 
Al Hajaj District and its villages ([52], p. 2).
It was very evident that for local communities, the conflict-
related destruction was intricately linked to rural-based 
livelihoods, which was a distinct move from the earlier 
urban-based interventions. For example, problems 
stemmed from the construction of battle defences such as 
earth mounds using agricultural soils, thus damaging 
farmland surfaces and creating deep erosion:
and from the loss of electricity supply lines and 
transformers that provide the electricity to run the 
irrigation pumps. In addition, many of the farm lands are 
overgrown with weeds and shrubs and farmers no longer 
have access to suitable equipment, farm inputs (fertilisers/
seeds), tools and labour to prepare for the coming spring 
season. In regards to livestock, locally-constructed 
cowsheds and poultry farms have been damaged and 
restocking of livestock is also urgently required. In many of 
the villages there is debris and [rubble] is scattered around, 
with solid waste adding to the piles. The local authorities 
are unable to deliver any services such as debris removal 
and solid waste management. The residents of Al Hajaj 
District were in urgent need of assistance particularly to 
encourage returnees by providing an enabling environment 
that supported local food production with a focus of 
targeting the most vulnerable families in the District  
([52], p. 2).
In Al Hajaj, Dhuluiyah and Yathrib, where the frontlines 
had been very fluid, landmines had not been laid by IS, 
although all the villages and farming areas were inspected 
for unexploded ordinances once they had been retaken. 
From the perspective of HRF (and, indirectly, the donor 
UNDP), the case for linking post-conflict stabilisation 
with agriculture was clearly made in the project 
rationale:
The project was required to provide immediate support 
for current residents which provided incentives and 
boosted the safe return of displaced families through the 
rehabilitation of livelihoods in the newly accessible areas of 
Al Hajaj District. Linking livelihood stabilisation and 
enterprise recovery provides the building blocks in 
long-term recovery and the building of a strong local 
economy which is also required to build social cohesion 
and minimise the impacts of the regional conflict as well as 
deterring extremism and sectarian-based violence which 
has clearly recently been evident in all areas of Salah  
Al-Din Governorate ([52], p. 3).
The practical activities were designed around seven 
different types of interventions:
1. preparation of agricultural lands;
2. repair of irrigation systems;
3. repair of livestock sheds;
4. restocking of livestock/bee keeping;
5. rubble removal;
6. street cleaning and solid waste management and
7. housing repairs.
Activities 1–4 were designed specifically around agriculture 
and farm infrastructure, whilst the Activities 5–7 were a 
continuation of previous urban-based interventions but 
now aimed at clearing the rubble, debris and solid waste 
that had accumulated in the district town and surrounding 
villages of Al Hajaj District. In Activity 1—the preparation 
of agricultural lands, a number of practical steps were 
taken following the assessment and prioritisation of 
farming plots. This first included the removal of weeds and 
shrubs through weeding and hoeing. An attempt was then 
made to introduce improved farming techniques through 
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the introduction of bio-waste composting using compost 
windrows in the fields to produce compost from crop 
wastes and weeds. This was then followed by the tilling and 
raking of top soil and the provision of farm inputs to 
selected beneficiaries. All the practical work was conducted 
through the cash-for-work modality. Activity 2, repair of 
irrigation systems, comprised of two main components: 
(i) repair of the key transformers used to supply electricity 
to the irrigation pumps and (ii) repair of irrigation lines and 
pumps. The latter also involved the repairing of 3 mainline 
irrigation pumps (used to supply river water to the 
irrigation channels) and 55 on-farm irrigation pumps (used 
to pump water from the irrigation channels to the fields). 
In Activity 3—repair of livestock sheds, the shelters for 
both dairy cattle and poultry facilities were repaired, again 
using a cash-for-work modality. In Activity 4, the restocking 
of livestock/bee hives took place, with a total of 20 cows, 
50,000 poultry and 20 fully-prepared bee hives being 
handed over to the farmers. All the livestock/bee hives 
were sourced from areas that had not been directly 
affected by the IS, with HRF procuring these stocks from 
livestock markets and bee suppliers.
The final project report [52] included a section “Lessons 
Learned”,  within which was two suggestions: (i) opportunities 
for the improvement in agricultural techniques and 
extension and (ii) potential for solar irrigation. Both these 
suggestions were aimed at making the conventional river-
irrigated farming systems—that were located on the River 
Tigris—more resilient and climate smart:
Improvement in agricultural techniques and extension
The current stabilisation programmes are based on the 
provision of inputs through “financial inputs” as cash-for-
work and “agricultural inputs”. Both of these are forms of 
short duration stabilisation injections that provide an initial 
boost to upstart agricultural livelihoods, and return to 
previous farming systems. However, these systems are 
based on conventional agriculture that is dependent on 
chemical inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides.  An effort 
should be made to make farmers more aware [of] organic 
and low-external-input-sustainable-agriculture (LEISA). This 
could take the form of: 1) establishing demonstration farms; 
2) on-farm-training; 3) capacity building of local agriculture 
offices and extension staff. Such activities could still be 
delivered during a stabilisation programme allowing for the 
delivery of improved technical services for local farmers 
([52], p. 8).
Solar irrigation
The river-based farming systems in Iraq provide excellent 
conditions to establish solar-based irrigation systems. This 
would involve the replacing of conventional irrigation 
equipment (using electricity or diesel pump supplies) with 
solar-powered irrigation equipment to build resilient 
river-based farming systems. It is strongly recommended 
that a pilot solar irrigation is developed in Iraq. HRF have 
now held meetings with solar equipment suppliers and are 
developing a concept note ([52], p. 9).
Due to the successful implementation of the Stabilisation 
Agriculture project in Al Hajaj District, and although there 
was no formal project evaluation owing to the emergency 
nature of the interventions, a second project was planned 
for Dhuluiyah District. This followed a similar format and 
content as was implemented in Al Hajaj District, again with 
a 3-month duration, but with the additional activities of 
repairing 21 plastic polytunnels for horticulture, and 
rehabilitating “institutional buildings” that included school 
classrooms and the food storage warehouse at the 
Agriculture Directorate, the latter being very relevant in 
the context of local food security [53]. Following this 
Stabilisation Agriculture project in Dhuluiyah District, the 
next intervention was made in Yathrib District. Again this 
followed a similar format and content as the previous two 
projects but now with a 4-month duration, and instead of 
irrigation repairs, an irrigation sub-canal was constructed, 
and finally fruit trees, including pomegranate and apple, 
were added to the list of farm inputs being supplied to the 
beneficiaries. It is worth noting that the construction of 
the irrigation sub-canal had the primary aim of conflict 
resolution and only then a secondary aim of land 
reclamation for agricultural production. As previously, the 
Sunni communities had predominant access to the 
irrigation channels in the Yathrib District, but by extending 
the channels into new areas that are populated by Shia 
communities, this allowed improved access for all. 
Consequently, the project helped resolve a conflict across 
a traditional sectarian divide and thus allowed communities 
that were once forcibly displaced to return home, proving 
a clear example of the important role that agriculture can 
play in stabilisation and more specifically in peacebuilding.
Integrating agriculture into stabilisation planning
The linkages between agriculture and conflict have been 
clearly established in the edited volumes of Ӧzerdem and 
Roberts [8] and Tidball and Krasny [19]. Food insecurity, 
for example, can trigger instability and conflict, leading to 
the collapse of agricultural infrastructure, the loss of farm 
labour and local farming knowledge through loss of life 
and forced migration. This cycle becomes endemic and 
reinforcing, often resulting in chronic food shortages and 
eventually conflict-driven famine. Climate change and any 
subsequent regional changes in rainfall variability only 
compound the complex and multifaceted nexus between 
agriculture, food security and conflict. Hence, why an initial 
advantage of adopting a Stabilisation Agriculture approach 
is that it elevates the important role that agriculture can 
play in post-conflict and stabilisation settings. This is clearly 
shown in the Helmand case study, when illicit agriculture 
and the production of opium funded the Taliban’s conflict 
against the Afghan government. And this example of funding 
conflict from illicit land-based activities is not unique to 
Afghanistan, for example, in Somalia, a similar scenario has 
occurred but with illegal charcoal production, which has 
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provided revenue for Al-Shabaab’s conflict against the 
Somali government [55, 56].
Stabilisation Agriculture has a clear role to play in 
developing alternative and licit livelihoods, but this has to 
be achieved within the context of working towards a 
thriving agricultural economy, so that it results in an 
antithesis to narcotic or illegal economies. This also 
requires a good understanding of local issues that are facing 
farmers and of the political ecology that controls the 
exploitation of natural resources from local to international 
influences. Whilst improved security allows the 
development of agricultural-based economies, a thriving 
agricultural economy then reinforces the security through 
economic stabilisation, as demonstrated in the case study 
from the Salah Al-Din Governorate. Furthermore, when 
local extension services from the relevant ministries are 
fully integrated within the stabilisation approach, then this 
contributes to establishing the legitimacy of the government 
amongst local committees and key stakeholders, as in the 
case in Helmand, where it also opened the pathway for 
agricultural ministry staff to engage in wider agricultural 
development at the regional and local levels. In both case 
studies, local government played a clear role in community 
mobilisation and also the co-production of knowledge 
through the completion of need assessments that were 
often done under time pressures. In the post-conflict 
situation, participatory approaches are less effective as 
access, security and time all become critical obstacles to 
effective communication at the farm level.
Stabilisation Agriculture programmes can also stimulate 
livelihoods and provide immediate economic stabilisation 
through cash-based injections, using modalities such as 
cash for work and cash grants. However, these post-
conflict and stabilisation tools are, nevertheless, frequently 
used for more mundane post-conflict clear-up activities 
with the primary purpose of providing cash to vulnerable 
beneficiaries, allowing them to purchase food, water and 
other essential necessities. In contrast, funding Stabilisation 
Agriculture programmes contributes to a swifter re-
establishment of primary food production systems, which 
in turn are required to build food security for both urban 
and rural populations. Within the wider context of food 
security, such programmes can be designed to rehabilitate 
agricultural infrastructure, such as the food storage 
warehouse at the Agriculture Directorate in Dhuluiyah 
District, or to establish new agricultural facilities such as 
the construction of the irrigation sub-canal in Yathrib 
District, which not only increased food production for the 
region but also resolved a long-standing local conflict, thus 
providing one of the clearest examples of the positive role 
that agriculture can play in post-conflict and stabilisation 
processes and even for the objective of peacebuilding. The 
peacebuilding dimension is also highlighted in the recent 
work of McAllister and Wright [49] in rural Zimbabwe, as 
they suggest in this fragile context that agroecology as a 
form of sustainable agriculture may be people-centred, 
rural peacebuilding praxis and that the social aspects of 
farming have the ability to re-forge relationships and 
bridge divisions.
Conclusion
Arguably, one of the main benefits from developing the 
concept of “Stabilisation Agriculture” is the repositioning it 
brings by elevating agriculture as a critical response tool in 
post-conflict and stabilisation settings. The importance of 
this has been demonstrated in the case studies from 
Afghanistan and Iraq and is also evident and being played-
out each day in the contemporary fragile states of Libya, 
Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen, where conflict is creating 
havoc on local agricultural production, creating cycles of 
food shortages that in many case lead to famine and mass 
forced migration. Perhaps it is this agriculture, food security 
and conflict nexus that forms the crux of Stabilisation 
Agriculture, or as described in the first promotional 
material “Exploring sustainable agriculture and institutional 
engagement in ‘stabilisation’ regions” ([1], p. 1). Certainly, 
the Stabilisation Agriculture case studies from Afghanistan 
and Iraq have focussed on this nexus rather than the 
broader definitional components of re-establishing 
agriculture after natural disasters, the sustainable 
management of abiotic and biotic stresses in agriculture 
and integrating and mainstreaming agroecology through 
programmes, policies and institutions, for disaster risk 
reduction (DRR). In some sense, these broader components 
can be simply viewed as “sustainable agriculture”, such as 
agroecology or agroforestry, but in a disaster risk 
management context or within a disaster risk reduction 
approach, whereas post-conflict stabilisation in this context 
is clearly not relevant. And whilst some may argue that 
“stabilisation” also applies to bio-physical earth processes, 
it should be noted that these are already included by 
default in sustainable agriculture. Therefore, in conclusion, 
the authors rather reiterate and emphasise the important 
and positive role that agriculture can play in post-conflict 
and stabilisation settings, particularly in those post-conflict 
areas also affected by the climate crisis, and thus offer a 
redefined definition:
Stabilisation Agriculture can be defined as any agricultural 
activity undertaken as an initial response in conflict and 
fragile settings to protect primary food production 
systems, address fragility, reduce conflict, and prepare an 
integrated transition for environmental protection, food 
security, peacebuilding and longer term stability.
Linked to this definition, it should also be reiterated that 
Stabilisation Agriculture is not a return to the past or to 
the pre-conflict conditions. Rather the opposite, as change 
is embraced to improve on the previous farming systems 
through the introduction of regenerative and ecological 
approaches that build resilience and that are climate 
smart, for example, through the adoption of agroecology 
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or agroforestry-based systems. It is from these multiple 
and dynamic perspectives that the authors call for 
Stabilisation Agriculture to be mainstreamed into 
stabilisation theory at the policy level and into stabilisation 
and post-conflict programmes at the operational level. To 
facilitate this process, increased funding and support at the 
two strategic levels of policy and operations will be 
required, to create an enabling environment that allows all 
the benefits of Stabilisation Agriculture to flourish, thus 
addressing food security and peacebuilding in a range of 
conflict, post-conflict and stabilisation settings, particularly 
in geographical areas that may also be subject to the 
dynamic pressures resulting from the climate crisis.
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A, Roberts R, editors. Challenging post-conflict environments: 
sustainable agriculture. Surrey, UK: Ashgate; 2012. p. 103–15.
 15. Asenso-Okyere K, Kebede SW. The effects of civil war on 
agricultural development and rural livelihood in Sierra Leone. 
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